National Scrapie Eradication Program June 2020 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2020
National Scrapie Eradication Program June 2020 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2020
National Scrapie Eradication Program June 2020 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2020
U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Veterinary Services Strategy and Policy, Ruminant Health Center Small Ruminant Health July 15, 2020
Program Summary
Performance Measures – The percent of cull black-faced sheep found positive at slaughter (Chart 1) and the percent of cull sheep found positive at slaughter and adjusted for face color1 (Chart 2) remains at 0 percent. The retrospective 6-month rolling average of the percent positive, black-faced sheep sampled at RSSS collection sites has been 0 since June 2016.
Scrapie Testing Results2 – Nor98-like scrapie was confirmed in a sheep sampled at slaughter in May 2020.
In October 2019, lymph node tissue collected from a lamb at slaughter had suspect staining on IHC. Genotype of the lamb was AA at codon 136 and RR at codon 171, which is considered to be resistant to classical scrapie. Additional testing, using three alternative antibodies to scrapie, produced mixed results. Due to the unusual staining, results for this animal were reported as ‘inconclusive’ for classical scrapie. Further testing was conducted on the flock which was depopulated for diagnostic purposes and all samples were not detected by IHC. This case has similar staining to an RR lamb tested in April 2018.
1White, black and mottled-faced color sheep are weighted based on population; white-faced sheep have the greatest weight. If a white-faced positive sheep is found, this statistic will markedly increase. See notes below.
2Samples collected between October 1, 2019 and June 30, 2020, and confirmed by July 15, 2020.
As of June 30, 2020, 23,954 samples have been collected in FY 2020, 19,018 from sheep and 4,936 from goats.
There have been 488 NVSL confirmed positive animals (473 classical cases – 470 sheep and 3 goats) and
15 Nor98-like cases since the beginning of RSSS. No animals have tested positive for scrapie in FY 2020.
snip...see full text;
NOR-98
still no map???
WEDNESDAY, MAY 29, 2019
Incomplete inactivation of atypical scrapie following recommended autoclave decontamination procedures USDA HERE'S YOUR SIGN!
-----Original Message-----
From: Terry Singeltary
To:
Sent: Tue, Jun 30, 2020 11:12 am
Subject: National Scrapie Eradication Program May 2020 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2020 U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Veterinary Services Strategy and Policy, Ruminant Health Center Small Ruminant Health June 15, 2020
ZOONOTIC CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION UPDATE
here is the latest;
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE
Oral transmission of CWD into Cynomolgus macaques: signs of atypical disease, prion conversion and infectivity in macaques and bio-assayed transgenic mice
Hermann M. Schatzl, Samia Hannaoui, Yo-Ching Cheng, Sabine Gilch (Calgary Prion Research Unit, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada) Michael Beekes (RKI Berlin), Walter Schulz-Schaeffer (University of Homburg/Saar, Germany), Christiane Stahl-Hennig (German Primate Center) & Stefanie Czub (CFIA Lethbridge).
To date, BSE is the only example of interspecies transmission of an animal prion disease into humans. The potential zoonotic transmission of CWD is an alarming issue and was addressed by many groups using a variety of in vitro and in vivo experimental systems. Evidence from these studies indicated a substantial, if not absolute, species barrier, aligning with the absence of epidemiological evidence suggesting transmission into humans. Studies in non-human primates were not conclusive so far, with oral transmission into new-world monkeys and no transmission into old-world monkeys. Our consortium has challenged 18 Cynomolgus macaques with characterized CWD material, focusing on oral transmission with muscle tissue. Some macaques have orally received a total of 5 kg of muscle material over a period of 2 years.
After 5-7 years of incubation time some animals showed clinical symptoms indicative of prion disease, and prion neuropathology and PrPSc deposition were detected in spinal cord and brain of some euthanized animals. PrPSc in immunoblot was weakly detected in some spinal cord materials and various tissues tested positive in RT-QuIC, including lymph node and spleen homogenates. To prove prion infectivity in the macaque tissues, we have intracerebrally inoculated 2 lines of transgenic mice, expressing either elk or human PrP. At least 3 TgElk mice, receiving tissues from 2 different macaques, showed clinical signs of a progressive prion disease and brains were positive in immunoblot and RT-QuIC. Tissues (brain, spinal cord and spleen) from these and pre-clinical mice are currently tested using various read-outs and by second passage in mice. Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were so far negative for clear clinical prion disease (some mice >300 days p.i.). In parallel, the same macaque materials are inoculated into bank voles.
Taken together, there is strong evidence of transmissibility of CWD orally into macaques and from macaque tissues into transgenic mouse models, although with an incomplete attack rate.
The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology.
Our ongoing studies will show whether the transmission of CWD into macaques and passage in transgenic mice represents a form of non-adaptive prion amplification, and whether macaque-adapted prions have the potential to infect mice expressing human PrP.
The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD..
***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD. <***
https://prion2018.org/
READING OVER THE PRION 2018 ABSTRACT BOOK, LOOKS LIKE THEY FOUND THAT from this study ;
P190 Human prion disease mortality rates by occurrence of chronic wasting disease in freeranging cervids, United States
Abrams JY (1), Maddox RA (1), Schonberger LB (1), Person MK (1), Appleby BS (2), Belay ED (1) (1) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Atlanta, GA, USA (2) Case Western Reserve University, National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center (NPDPSC), Cleveland, OH, USA..
SEEMS THAT THEY FOUND Highly endemic states had a higher rate of prion disease mortality compared to non-CWD
states.
AND ANOTHER STUDY;
P172 Peripheral Neuropathy in Patients with Prion Disease
Wang H(1), Cohen M(1), Appleby BS(1,2) (1) University Hospitals Cleveland Medical Center, Cleveland, Ohio (2) National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center, Cleveland, Ohio..
IN THIS STUDY, THERE WERE autopsy-proven prion cases from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center that were diagnosed between September 2016 to March 2017,
AND
included 104 patients. SEEMS THEY FOUND THAT The most common sCJD subtype was MV1-2 (30%), followed by MM1-2 (20%),
AND
THAT The Majority of cases were male (60%), AND half of them had exposure to wild game.
snip...
see more on Prion 2017 Macaque study from Prion 2017 Conference and other updated science on cwd tse prion zoonosis below...terry
https://prion2018.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/program.pdf
https://prion2018.org/
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 04, 2018
Cervid to human prion transmission 5R01NS088604-04 Update
http://grantome.com/grant/NIH/R01-NS088604-04
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2018/10/cervid-to-human-prion-transmission.html
snip...full text;
From: Terry Singeltary
To:
Sent: Tue, Jun 30, 2020 11:12 am
Subject: National Scrapie Eradication Program May 2020 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2020 U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Veterinary Services Strategy and Policy, Ruminant Health Center Small Ruminant Health June 15, 2020
National Scrapie Eradication Program May 2020 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2020 U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Veterinary Services Strategy and Policy, Ruminant Health Center Small Ruminant Health June 15, 2020
Program Summary
Performance Measures – The percent of cull black-faced sheep found positive at slaughter (Chart 1) and the percent of cull sheep found positive at slaughter and adjusted for face color1 (Chart 2) remains at 0 percent. The retrospective 6-month rolling average of the percent positive, black-faced sheep sampled at RSSS collection sites has been 0 since June 2016.
Scrapie Testing Results2 – In October 2019, lymph node tissue collected from a lamb at slaughter had suspect staining on IHC. Genotype of the lamb was AA at codon 136 and RR at codon 171, which is considered to be resistant to classical scrapie. Additional testing, using three alternative antibodies to scrapie, produced mixed results. Due to the unusual staining, results for this animal were reported as ‘inconclusive’ for classical scrapie. Further testing was conducted on the flock which was depopulated for diagnostic purposes and all samples were not detected by IHC. This case has similar staining to an RR lamb tested in April 2018.
1White, black and mottled-faced color sheep are weighted based on population; white-faced sheep have the greatest weight. If a white-faced positive sheep is found, this statistic will markedly increase. See notes below.
2Samples collected between October 1, 2019 and May 31, 2020, and confirmed by June 15, 2020.
Program Summary Infected and Source Flocks - There have been no infected herds identified in FY 2020. One flock in Texas has an open infected status since April 2016, but there are no exposed animals on the premises. Cleaning and disinfection of the premises has to be completed before the status can be closed. The number of newly designated infected and source flocks by year since 1997 is shown in Chart 3. The peak was in 2005 with 180 flocks.
Scrapie in Goats –The total number of NVSL confirmed positive cases in goats is 44 since FY 2002. Samples from three of these positive animals were collected through RSSS, one in November 2014, the second in July 2018, and the most recent in June 2019. The remainder of the positive cases have been found through testing of clinical suspects, testing of exposed animals, and trace-out investigations. Figure 1 shows the number of positive cases by State and by fiscal year of last reported case.
Program Summary Scrapie Free Flock Certification Program (SFCP) – As of May 31, 2020, there were 242 flocks participating in the Scrapie Free Flock Certification Program (SFCP). Statuses of these flocks were 40 export monitored, 41 export certified, and 161 select monitored flocks (Figure 2). SFCP open statuses by fiscal year of Status date3 from FY 2007 to FY 2020 are depicted in Chart 4.
3Chart 4 represents the cumulative change in SFCP enrollment over time, and includes open and closed statuses/programs, and active and inactive flocks/herds. Previous charts of SFCP participation by year were manually updated and used the enrollment date to determine the year of participation in SFCP. With the change to Tableau charts, the start/status date is used. Many participating flocks were grandfathered into the Export category in 2013 with an earlier status date.
Surveillance
Surveillance activities are reported by Field Operations Districts shown in Figure 3. Surveillance minimums are based on estimated breeding sheep and goat populations in each State. The distribution of sheep and goat populations by District is depicted in Chart 5.
Components of Scrapie Surveillance
• Regulatory Scrapie Slaughter Surveillance (RSSS) started April 1, 2003. It is a targeted slaughter surveillance program which is designed to identify infected flocks.
Samples have been collected from 656,214 animals since April 1, 2003.
As of May 31, 2020, 21,432 samples have been collected in FY 2020, 17,079 from sheep and 4,353 from goats.
There have been 487 NVSL confirmed positive animals (473 classical cases – 470 sheep and 3 goats)
and
14 Nor98-like cases since the beginning of RSSS. No animals have tested positive for scrapie in FY 2020.
Does not include Nor98-like scrapie cases found through RSSS.
Does not include Nor98-like scrapie cases found through RSSS.
a map of atypical NOR98-like scrapie could be put up as easily as this map of typical scrapie in Goats imo, on page 13 under Scrapie Cases in Goats FY 2002 – FY 2020
snip...i can't stomach anymore, see full text;
This report is fancy and all with graphs, charts, really shiny and pretty, but, imo, it's nothing more than attempt to water down what has been going on for decades, i.e. let's make this look better than it is, as little surveillance and testing as possible, and let's not talk about the fact that atypical scrapie is just as dangerous to humans and animals, yet the USDA OIE et al went to junk science on that one, and classified it as a legally trading commodity, really dumb in my opinion, and the surveillance efforts are still nothing more than do everything possible NOT to find anymore cases of scrapie tse prion, just like BSE and CWD. i was told years ago there would be a map added of the scrapie and ATYPICAL SCRAPIE cases. oh well, i am not impressed by this report...for whatever that's worth...terry
Front Bioeng Biotechnol. 2020; 8: 164. Published online 2020 Mar 12. doi: 10.3389/fbioe.2020.00164 PMCID: PMC7081731
The Scrapie Prevalence in a Goat Herd Is Underestimated by Using a Rapid Diagnostic Test
Timm Konold,1,* John Spiropoulos,1 Jemma Thorne,1 Laura Phelan,1 Louise Fothergill,2 Brenda Rajanayagam,3 Tobias Floyd,1 Beatriz Vidana,1 Judith Charnley,4 Nadya Coates,5 and Marion Simmons1
Author information Article notes Copyright and License information Disclaimer Associated Data Supplementary Materials Data Availability Statement Go to:
Abstract
Current European surveillance regulations for scrapie, a naturally occurring transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) or prion disease in sheep and goats, require testing of fallen stock or healthy slaughter animals, and outline measures in the case of confirmation of disease. An outbreak of classical scrapie in a herd with 2500 goats led to the culling of the whole herd, providing the opportunity to examine a subset of goats, take samples, and examine them for the presence of disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc) to provide further information on scrapie test sensitivity, pathology, and association with prion protein genotype. Goats were examined clinically prior to cull, and the brains examined post mortem by Bio-Rad ELISA, a rapid screening test used for active surveillance in sheep and goats, and two confirmatory tests, Western blot and immunohistochemistry. Furthermore, up to 10 lymphoid tissues were examined by immunohistochemistry. Of 151 goats examined, three (2.0%) tested positive for scrapie by ELISA on brain, confirmed by confirmatory tests, and a further five (3.3%) were negative by ELISA but positive by at least one of the confirmatory tests. Only two of these, both positive by ELISA, displayed evident signs of scrapie. In addition, 10 (6.6%) goats, which also included two clinical suspects, were negative on brain examination but had detectable PrPSc in lymphoid tissue. PrPSc was detected most frequently in the medial retropharyngeal lymph node (LN; 94.4% of all 18 cases) and palatine tonsil (88.9%). Abnormal behavior and circling or loss of balance when blindfolded were the best clinical discriminators for scrapie status. None of the goats that carried a single allele in the prion protein gene associated with increased resistance to scrapie (Q211, K222, S146) were scrapie-positive, and the percentage of goats with these alleles was greater than expected from previous surveys. Significantly more goats that were scrapie-positive were isoleucine homozygous at codon 142 (II142). The results indicate that the sensitivity of the applied screening test is poor in goats compared to the confirmatory tests as gold standard, particularly for asymptomatic animals. Sensitivity of surveillance could be improved by testing retropharyngeal LN or palatine tonsil in addition to brain.
snip...
Conclusion
The results of this study continue to highlight the limitations of the Bio-Rad ELISA as brain screening test to diagnose classical scrapie in goats, and other or additional tests should be considered. It is recommended to include testing of the medial retropharyngeal LN or palatine tonsil, which are also located at the head that is generally submitted for testing and are less prone to rapid autolysis, to increase the sensitivity of goat scrapie surveillance.
Keywords: transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, prion, classical scrapie, goat, clinical diagnosis, immunohistochemistry, ELISA
TUESDAY, MARCH 31, 2020
The Scrapie Prevalence in a Goat Herd Is Underestimated by Using a Rapid Diagnostic Test
April 22, 2016
Scrapie Confirmed in a Hartley County Sheep
AUSTIN – Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC) officials have confirmed scrapie in a Hartley County ewe. The ewe was tested by TAHC after the owner reported signs of weight loss and lack of coordination to their local veterinarian. The premises was quarantined and a flock plan for monitoring is being developed by the TAHC and USDA.
“The TAHC is working closely with the flock owner, sharing all of the options for disease eradication,” said Dr. David Finch, TAHC Region 1 Director. “We are thankful the producer was proactive in identifying a problem and seeking veterinary help immediately.”
Texas leads the nation in sheep and goat production. Since 2008, there have been no confirmed cases of scrapie in Texas. The last big spike in Texas scrapie cases was in 2006 when nine infected herds were identified and the last herd was released from restrictions in 2013.
According to USDA regulations, Texas must conduct adequate scrapie surveillance by collecting a minimum of 598 sheep samples annually. Since USDA slaughter surveillance started in FY 2003, the percent of cull sheep found positive for scrapie at slaughter (once adjusted for face color) has decreased 90 percent.
Scrapie is the oldest known transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, and under natural conditions only sheep and goats are known to be affected by scrapie. It is a fatal disease that affects the central nervous system of sheep and goats. It is not completely understood how scrapie is passed from one animal to the next and apparently healthy sheep infected with scrapie can spread the disease. Sheep and goats are typically infected as young lambs or kids, though adult sheep and goats can become infected.
The most effective method of scrapie prevention is to maintain a closed flock. Raising replacement ewes, purchasing genetically resistant rams and ewes, or buying from a certified-free scrapie flock are other options to reduce the risk of scrapie. At this time the resistant genetic markers in goats have not been identified, therefore it is important to maintain your sheep and goat herds separately.
The incubation period for Scrapie is typically two to five years. Producers should record individual identification numbers and the seller’s premise identification number on purchase and sales records. These records must be maintained for a minimum of five years.
Producers should notify the Texas Animal Health Commission (800-550-8242) or the USDA-Austin Office (512-383-2400) if they have an adult sheep or goat with neurologic signs such as incoordination, behavioral changes, or intense itching with wool loss. Producers may order scrapie identification tags by calling 866-873-2824.
For more information, please visit our website at: http://www.tahc.texas.gov/animal_health/scrapie/scrapie.html.
###
***> Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years
***> Nine of these recurrences occurred 14–21 years after culling, apparently as the result of environmental contamination, but outside entry could not always be absolutely excluded.
Gudmundur Georgsson,1 Sigurdur Sigurdarson2 and Paul Brown3
Correspondence
Gudmundur Georgsson ggeorgs@hi.is
1 Institute for Experimental Pathology, University of Iceland, Keldur v/vesturlandsveg, IS-112 Reykjavı´k, Iceland
2 Laboratory of the Chief Veterinary Officer, Keldur, Iceland
3 Bethesda, Maryland, USA
Received 7 March 2006 Accepted 6 August 2006
In 1978, a rigorous programme was implemented to stop the spread of, and subsequently eradicate, sheep scrapie in Iceland. Affected flocks were culled, premises were disinfected and, after 2–3 years, restocked with lambs from scrapie-free areas. Between 1978 and 2004, scrapie recurred on 33 farms. Nine of these recurrences occurred 14–21 years after culling, apparently as the result of environmental contamination, but outside entry could not always be absolutely excluded. Of special interest was one farm with a small, completely self-contained flock where scrapie recurred 18 years after culling, 2 years after some lambs had been housed in an old sheephouse that had never been disinfected. Epidemiological investigation established with near certitude that the disease had not been introduced from the outside and it is concluded that the agent may have persisted in the old sheep-house for at least 16 years.
WHY NOT SHOW A DETAILED MAP OF ATYPICAL NOR98-like Scrapie $$$
WHAT could some ramifications be from purposely omitting ATYPICAL NOR98-LIKE SCRAPIE???
Tuesday, June 3, 2008
SCRAPIE USA UPDATE JUNE 2008 NOR-98 REPORTED PA
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/06/scrapie-usa-update-june-2008-nor-98.html
SCRAPIE USA UPDATE JUNE 2008 NOR-98 REPORTED PA
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/06/scrapie-usa-update-june-2008-nor-98.html
Case 6
The sixth case of Nor98 scrapie was identified in a 4-year-old, white-faced ewe that was purchased and added to a commercial flock in Pennsylvania that consisted of approximately 700 head of sheep and goats. Individual animal records were not kept on the premises, so it was impossible to determine exactly how long the ewe was on the farm or her flock of origin. It was estimated that she remained in this flock for approximately 1 month, was sent to slaughter, and was tested for PrPSc as part of the RSSS program. No clinical signs suggestive of scrapie disease were noted. The Prnp genotype of the case 6 ewe was AFRQ/ALRQ (136 AA, 141 FL, 154 RR, 171 QQ). Evaluation of the brain by using HE revealed no lesions. IHC highlighted PrPSc bilaterally in the spinal nucleus of the trigeminal nerve (Fig. 1H) and in the dorsal aspect of the dorsal horns of the cervical spinal cord. PrPSc immunolabeling in the dorsal motor nucleus of the vagus nerve and in lymphoid tissue was absent. Cerebellum was unavailable for evaluation. ELISA and Western blot tests were not done because fresh tissue was unavailable. The commercial flock was depopulated, and adult animals exposed to this ewe were tested for scrapie. No additional cases of Nor98 or classic scrapie were identified. A summary of relevant findings from all cases is shown in Table 1.
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2019
The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/Nor98 scrapie
Monday, November 30, 2009
USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH CODE
Thursday, December 20, 2012
*** OIE GROUP RECOMMENDS THAT SCRAPE PRION DISEASE BE DELISTED, WISHES TO CONTINUE SPREADING IT AROUND THE GLOBE
This surveillance plan is designed to speed the eradication of classical scrapie. Cases of nonclassical (Nor98-like) scrapie will be found because of testing for classical scrapie but the plan is not designed to maximize these detections. Nor98-like scrapie has its own unique characteristics, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the OIE have concluded that it is “clinically, pathologically, biochemically, and epidemiologically unrelated to classical scrapie, may not be contagious and may, in fact, be a spontaneous degenerative condition of older sheep.” As a result, APHIS does not restrict or depopulate animals exposed to Nor98-like scrapie.
***> As a result, APHIS does not restrict or depopulate animals exposed to Nor98-like scrapie.
incredible stupidity, not based on sound science, see;
WEDNESDAY, MAY 29, 2019
Incomplete inactivation of atypical scrapie following recommended autoclave decontamination procedures USDA HERE'S YOUR SIGN!
***> Thus, atypical scrapie is recognized as a separate, nonreportable disease by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).
''as usual, OIE USDA et al put cart before horse, and put human and animal life at risk...terry''
Atypical scrapie has been transmitted experimentally to AHQ sheep by the intracranial145 and oral146 routes. An increased risk of atypical scrapie has also been identified in sheep with the AF141RQ haplotype.137 Atypical scrapie does experimentally transmit to sheep with the AL141RQ haplotype but with very long incubation periods without clinical signs.123 Furthermore, sheep with the ARR haplotype, which confers resistance to classical scrapie and is the cornerstone of genotype-based eradication programs, do not appear to be protected against developing atypical scrapie.41,137
Atypical scrapie has also been reported in goats,103,142 where the molecular profile on western blot is similar to atypical scrapie in sheep, but the distribution of lesions within the brain is more rostral (thalamus and midbrain) than atypical scrapie of sheep.142 Similar to sheep with atypical scrapie, histidine substitution at PRNP codon 154 is a risk factor for atypical scrapie in goats,32 and PrPSc has not been demonstrated in the lymphoid tissues of affected goats.142
end...see;
A newly identified type of scrapie agent can naturally infect sheep with resistant PrP genotypes
Annick Le Dur*,?, Vincent Béringue*,?, Olivier Andréoletti?, Fabienne Reine*, Thanh Lan Laï*, Thierry Baron§, Bjørn Bratberg¶, Jean-Luc Vilotte?, Pierre Sarradin**, Sylvie L. Benestad¶, and Hubert Laude*,?? +Author Affiliations
*Virologie Immunologie Moléculaires and ?Génétique Biochimique et Cytogénétique, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 78350 Jouy-en-Josas, France; ?Unité Mixte de Recherche, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique-Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse, Interactions Hôte Agent Pathogène, 31066 Toulouse, France; §Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, Unité Agents Transmissibles Non Conventionnels, 69364 Lyon, France; **Pathologie Infectieuse et Immunologie, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 37380 Nouzilly, France; and ¶Department of Pathology, National Veterinary Institute, 0033 Oslo, Norway
***Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA (received for review March 21, 2005)
Abstract
Scrapie in small ruminants belongs to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, a family of fatal neurodegenerative disorders that affect humans and animals and can transmit within and between species by ingestion or inoculation. Conversion of the host-encoded prion protein (PrP), normal cellular PrP (PrPc), into a misfolded form, abnormal PrP (PrPSc), plays a key role in TSE transmission and pathogenesis. The intensified surveillance of scrapie in the European Union, together with the improvement of PrPSc detection techniques, has led to the discovery of a growing number of so-called atypical scrapie cases. These include clinical Nor98 cases first identified in Norwegian sheep on the basis of unusual pathological and PrPSc molecular features and "cases" that produced discordant responses in the rapid tests currently applied to the large-scale random screening of slaughtered or fallen animals. Worryingly, a substantial proportion of such cases involved sheep with PrP genotypes known until now to confer natural resistance to conventional scrapie. Here we report that both Nor98 and discordant cases, including three sheep homozygous for the resistant PrPARR allele (A136R154R171), efficiently transmitted the disease to transgenic mice expressing ovine PrP, and that they shared unique biological and biochemical features upon propagation in mice.
*** These observations support the view that a truly infectious TSE agent, unrecognized until recently, infects sheep and goat flocks and may have important implications in terms of scrapie control and public health.
OR
***The pathology features of Nor98 in the cerebellum of the affected sheep showed similarities with those of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
OR
*** Intriguingly, these conclusions suggest that some pathological features of Nor98 are reminiscent of Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker disease.
OR here;
*** The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans and animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of prion diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about the epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating this latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and Nor98.
VARIABLY PROTEASE-SENSITVE PRIONOPATHY IS TRANSMISSIBLE ...price of prion poker goes up again $
OR-10: Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy is transmissible in bank voles
Romolo Nonno,1 Michele Di Bari,1 Laura Pirisinu,1 Claudia D’Agostino,1 Stefano Marcon,1 Geraldina Riccardi,1 Gabriele Vaccari,1 Piero Parchi,2 Wenquan Zou,3 Pierluigi Gambetti,3 Umberto Agrimi1 1Istituto Superiore di Sanità; Rome, Italy; 2Dipartimento di Scienze Neurologiche, Università di Bologna; Bologna, Italy; 3Case Western Reserve University; Cleveland, OH USA
Background. Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr) is a recently described “sporadic”neurodegenerative disease involving prion protein aggregation, which has clinical similarities with non-Alzheimer dementias, such as fronto-temporal dementia. Currently, 30 cases of VPSPr have been reported in Europe and USA, of which 19 cases were homozygous for valine at codon 129 of the prion protein (VV), 8 were MV and 3 were MM. A distinctive feature of VPSPr is the electrophoretic pattern of PrPSc after digestion with proteinase K (PK). After PK-treatment, PrP from VPSPr forms a ladder-like electrophoretic pattern similar to that described in GSS cases. The clinical and pathological features of VPSPr raised the question of the correct classification of VPSPr among prion diseases or other forms of neurodegenerative disorders. Here we report preliminary data on the transmissibility and pathological features of VPSPr cases in bank voles.
Materials and Methods. Seven VPSPr cases were inoculated in two genetic lines of bank voles, carrying either methionine or isoleucine at codon 109 of the prion protein (named BvM109 and BvI109, respectively). Among the VPSPr cases selected, 2 were VV at PrP codon 129, 3 were MV and 2 were MM. Clinical diagnosis in voles was confirmed by brain pathological assessment and western blot for PK-resistant PrPSc (PrPres) with mAbs SAF32, SAF84, 12B2 and 9A2.
Results. To date, 2 VPSPr cases (1 MV and 1 MM) gave positive transmission in BvM109. Overall, 3 voles were positive with survival time between 290 and 588 d post inoculation (d.p.i.). All positive voles accumulated PrPres in the form of the typical PrP27–30, which was indistinguishable to that previously observed in BvM109 inoculated with sCJDMM1 cases.
In BvI109, 3 VPSPr cases (2 VV and 1 MM) showed positive transmission until now. Overall, 5 voles were positive with survival time between 281 and 596 d.p.i.. In contrast to what observed in BvM109, all BvI109 showed a GSS-like PrPSc electrophoretic pattern, characterized by low molecular weight PrPres. These PrPres fragments were positive with mAb 9A2 and 12B2, while being negative with SAF32 and SAF84, suggesting that they are cleaved at both the C-terminus and the N-terminus. Second passages are in progress from these first successful transmissions.
Conclusions. Preliminary results from transmission studies in bank voles strongly support the notion that VPSPr is a transmissible prion disease. Interestingly, VPSPr undergoes divergent evolution in the two genetic lines of voles, with sCJD-like features in BvM109 and GSS-like properties in BvI109.
The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans and animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of prion diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about the epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating this latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and Nor98.
P.97: Scrapie transmits to white-tailed deer by the oral route and has a molecular profile similar to chronic wasting disease and distinct from the scrapie inoculum
Justin Greenlee1, S JO Moore1, Jodi Smith1, M Heather WestGreenlee2 and Robert Kunkle1
1National Animal Disease Center; Ames, IA USA
2Iowa State University; Ames, IA USA
The purpose of this work was to determine susceptibility of white-tailed deer (WTD) to the agent of sheep scrapie and to compare the resultant PrPSc to that of the original inoculum and chronic wasting disease (CWD). We inoculated WTD by a natural route of exposure (concurrent oral and intranasal (IN); n = 5) with a US scrapie isolate. All scrapie-inoculated deer had evidence of PrPSc accumulation. PrPSc was detected in lymphoid tissues at preclinical time points, and deer necropsied after 28 months post-inoculation had clinical signs, spongiform encephalopathy, and widespread distribution of PrPSc in neural and lymphoid tissues. Western blotting (WB) revealed PrPSc with 2 distinct molecular profiles. WB on cerebral cortex had a profile similar to the original scrapie inoculum, whereas WB of brainstem, cerebellum, or lymph nodes revealed PrPSc with a higher profile resembling CWD. Homogenates with the 2 distinct profiles from WTD with clinical scrapie were further passaged to mice expressing cervid prion protein and intranasally to sheep and WTD. In cervidized mice, the 2 inocula have distinct incubation times. Sheep inoculated intranasally with WTD derived scrapie developed disease, but only after inoculation with the inoculum that had a scrapie-like profile. The WTD study is ongoing, but deer in both inoculation groups are positive for PrPSc by rectal mucosal biopsy.
***In summary, this work demonstrates that WTD are susceptible to the agent of scrapie, 2 distinct molecular profiles of PrPSc are present in the tissues of affected deer, and inoculum of either profile readily passes to deer.
*** After a natural route of exposure, 100% of WTD were susceptible to scrapie.
PO-039: A comparison of scrapie and chronic wasting disease in white-tailed deer Justin Greenlee, Jodi Smith, Eric Nicholson US Dept. Agriculture; Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center; Ames, IA USA
White-tailed deer are susceptible to the agent of sheep scrapie by intracerebral inoculation
snip...
It is unlikely that CWD will be eradicated from free-ranging cervids, and the disease is likely to continue to spread geographically [10]. However, the potential that white-tailed deer may be susceptible to sheep scrapie by a natural route presents an additional confounding factor to halting the spread of CWD. This leads to the additional speculations that
1) infected deer could serve as a reservoir to infect sheep with scrapie offering challenges to scrapie eradication efforts and
2) CWD spread need not remain geographically confined to current endemic areas, but could occur anywhere that sheep with scrapie and susceptible cervids cohabitate.
This work demonstrates for the first time that white-tailed deer are susceptible to sheep scrapie by intracerebral inoculation with a high attack rate and that the disease that results has similarities to CWD. These experiments will be repeated with a more natural route of inoculation to determine the likelihood of the potential transmission of sheep scrapie to white-tailed deer. If scrapie were to occur in white-tailed deer, results of this study indicate that it would be detected as a TSE, but may be difficult to differentiate from CWD without in-depth biochemical analysis.
2012
PO-039: A comparison of scrapie and chronic wasting disease in white-tailed deer
Justin Greenlee, Jodi Smith, Eric Nicholson US Dept. Agriculture; Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center; Ames, IA USA
snip...
The results of this study suggest that there are many similarities in the manifestation of CWD and scrapie in WTD after IC inoculation including early and widespread presence of PrPSc in lymphoid tissues, clinical signs of depression and weight loss progressing to wasting, and an incubation time of 21-23 months. Moreover, western blots (WB) done on brain material from the obex region have a molecular profile similar to CWD and distinct from tissues of the cerebrum or the scrapie inoculum. However, results of microscopic and IHC examination indicate that there are differences between the lesions expected in CWD and those that occur in deer with scrapie: amyloid plaques were not noted in any sections of brain examined from these deer and the pattern of immunoreactivity by IHC was diffuse rather than plaque-like.
*** After a natural route of exposure, 100% of WTD were susceptible to scrapie.
Deer developed clinical signs of wasting and mental depression and were necropsied from 28 to 33 months PI. Tissues from these deer were positive for PrPSc by IHC and WB. Similar to IC inoculated deer, samples from these deer exhibited two different molecular profiles: samples from obex resembled CWD whereas those from cerebrum were similar to the original scrapie inoculum. On further examination by WB using a panel of antibodies, the tissues from deer with scrapie exhibit properties differing from tissues either from sheep with scrapie or WTD with CWD. Samples from WTD with CWD or sheep with scrapie are strongly immunoreactive when probed with mAb P4, however, samples from WTD with scrapie are only weakly immunoreactive. In contrast, when probed with mAb’s 6H4 or SAF 84, samples from sheep with scrapie and WTD with CWD are weakly immunoreactive and samples from WTD with scrapie are strongly positive. This work demonstrates that WTD are highly susceptible to sheep scrapie, but on first passage, scrapie in WTD is differentiable from CWD.
2011
*** After a natural route of exposure, 100% of white-tailed deer were susceptible to scrapie.
ZOONOSIS OF SCRAPIE TSE PRION
O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases).
Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.
*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period,
***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014),
***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases.
We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
===============
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases***
===============
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
==============
***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.
***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
PRION 2016 TOKYO
Saturday, April 23, 2016
SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016
Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online
Taylor & Francis
Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts
WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential
Juan Maria Torres a, Olivier Andreoletti b, J uan-Carlos Espinosa a. Vincent Beringue c. Patricia Aguilar a,
Natalia Fernandez-Borges a. and Alba Marin-Moreno a
"Centro de Investigacion en Sanidad Animal ( CISA-INIA ). Valdeolmos, Madrid. Spain; b UMR INRA -ENVT 1225 Interactions Holes Agents Pathogenes. ENVT. Toulouse. France: "UR892. Virologie lmmunologie MolécuIaires, Jouy-en-Josas. France
Dietary exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) contaminated bovine tissues is considered as the origin of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob (vCJD) disease in human. To date, BSE agent is the only recognized zoonotic prion... Despite the variety of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) agents that have been circulating for centuries in farmed ruminants there is no apparent epidemiological link between exposure to ruminant products and the occurrence of other form of TSE in human like sporadic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (sCJD). However, the zoonotic potential of the diversity of circulating TSE agents has never been systematically assessed. The major issue in experimental assessment of TSEs zoonotic potential lies in the modeling of the ‘species barrier‘, the biological phenomenon that limits TSE agents’ propagation from a species to another. In the last decade, mice genetically engineered to express normal forms of the human prion protein has proved essential in studying human prions pathogenesis and modeling the capacity of TSEs to cross the human species barrier.
To assess the zoonotic potential of prions circulating in farmed ruminants, we study their transmission ability in transgenic mice expressing human PrPC (HuPrP-Tg). Two lines of mice expressing different forms of the human PrPC (129Met or 129Val) are used to determine the role of the Met129Val dimorphism in susceptibility/resistance to the different agents.
These transmission experiments confirm the ability of BSE prions to propagate in 129M- HuPrP-Tg mice and demonstrate that Met129 homozygotes may be susceptible to BSE in sheep or goat to a greater degree than the BSE agent in cattle and that these agents can convey molecular properties and neuropathological indistinguishable from vCJD. However homozygous 129V mice are resistant to all tested BSE derived prions independently of the originating species suggesting a higher transmission barrier for 129V-PrP variant.
Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.
Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
***> why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man.
***> I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough.
***> Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.
snip...
R. BRADLEY
Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period)
*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS.
*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated.
*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains.
***> Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility. <***
Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period
Emmanuel E. Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Sophie Luccantoni-Freire, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Valérie Durand, Capucine Dehen, Olivier Andreoletti, Cristina Casalone, Juergen A. Richt, Justin J. Greenlee, Thierry Baron, Sylvie L. Benestad, Paul Brown & Jean-Philippe Deslys Scientific Reports volume 5, Article number: 11573 (2015) | Download Citation
Abstract
Classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (c-BSE) is the only animal prion disease reputed to be zoonotic, causing variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans and having guided protective measures for animal and human health against animal prion diseases. Recently, partial transmissions to humanized mice showed that the zoonotic potential of scrapie might be similar to c-BSE. We here report the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to cynomolgus macaque, a highly relevant model for human prion diseases, after a 10-year silent incubation period, with features similar to those reported for human cases of sporadic CJD. Scrapie is thus actually transmissible to primates with incubation periods compatible with their life expectancy, although fourfold longer than BSE. Long-term experimental transmission studies are necessary to better assess the zoonotic potential of other prion diseases with high prevalence, notably Chronic Wasting Disease of deer and elk and atypical/Nor98 scrapie.
SNIP...
Discussion We describe the transmission of spongiform encephalopathy in a non-human primate inoculated 10 years earlier with a strain of sheep c-scrapie. Because of this extended incubation period in a facility in which other prion diseases are under study, we are obliged to consider two alternative possibilities that might explain its occurrence. We first considered the possibility of a sporadic origin (like CJD in humans). Such an event is extremely improbable because the inoculated animal was 14 years old when the clinical signs appeared, i.e. about 40% through the expected natural lifetime of this species, compared to a peak age incidence of 60–65 years in human sporadic CJD, or about 80% through their expected lifetimes. Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.
The second possibility is a laboratory cross-contamination. Three facts make this possibility equally unlikely. First, handling of specimens in our laboratory is performed with fastidious attention to the avoidance of any such cross-contamination. Second, no laboratory cross-contamination has ever been documented in other primate laboratories, including the NIH, even between infected and uninfected animals housed in the same or adjacent cages with daily intimate contact (P. Brown, personal communication). Third, the cerebral lesion profile is different from all the other prion diseases we have studied in this model19, with a correlation between cerebellar lesions (massive spongiform change of Purkinje cells, intense PrPres staining and reactive gliosis26) and ataxia. The iron deposits present in the globus pallidus are a non specific finding that have been reported previously in neurodegenerative diseases and aging27. Conversely, the thalamic lesion was reminiscent of a metabolic disease due to thiamine deficiency28 but blood thiamine levels were within normal limits (data not shown). The preferential distribution of spongiform change in cortex associated with a limited distribution in the brainstem is reminiscent of the lesion profile in MM2c and VV1 sCJD patients29, but interspecies comparison of lesion profiles should be interpreted with caution. It is of note that the same classical scrapie isolate induced TSE in C57Bl/6 mice with similar incubation periods and lesional profiles as a sample derived from a MM1 sCJD patient30.
We are therefore confident that the illness in this cynomolgus macaque represents a true transmission of a sheep c-scrapie isolate directly to an old-world monkey, which taxonomically resides in the primate subdivision (parvorder of catarrhini) that includes humans. With an homology of its PrP protein with humans of 96.4%31, cynomolgus macaque constitutes a highly relevant model for assessing zoonotic risk of prion diseases. Since our initial aim was to show the absence of transmission of scrapie to macaques in the worst-case scenario, we obtained materials from a flock of naturally-infected sheep, affecting animals with different genotypes32. This c-scrapie isolate exhibited complete transmission in ARQ/ARQ sheep (332 ± 56 days) and Tg338 transgenic mice expressing ovine VRQ/VRQ prion protein (220 ± 5 days) (O. Andreoletti, personal communication). From the standpoint of zoonotic risk, it is important to note that sheep with c-scrapie (including the isolate used in our study) have demonstrable infectivity throughout their lymphoreticular system early in the incubation period of the disease (3 months-old for all the lymphoid organs, and as early as 2 months-old in gut-associated lymph nodes)33. In addition, scrapie infectivity has been identified in blood34, milk35 and skeletal muscle36 from asymptomatic but scrapie infected small ruminants which implies a potential dietary exposure for consumers.
Two earlier studies have reported the occurrence of clinical TSE in cynomolgus macaques after exposures to scrapie isolates. In the first study, the “Compton” scrapie isolate (derived from an English sheep) and serially propagated for 9 passages in goats did not transmit TSE in cynomolgus macaque, rhesus macaque or chimpanzee within 7 years following intracerebral challenge1; conversely, after 8 supplementary passages in conventional mice, this “Compton” isolate induced TSE in a cynomolgus macaque 5 years after intracerebral challenge, but rhesus macaques and chimpanzee remained asymptomatic 8.5 years post-exposure8. However, multiple successive passages that are classically used to select laboratory-adapted prion strains can significantly modify the initial properties of a scrapie isolate, thus questioning the relevance of zoonotic potential for the initial sheep-derived isolate. The same isolate had also induced disease into squirrel monkeys (new-world monkey)9. A second historical observation reported that a cynomolgus macaque developed TSE 6 years post-inoculation with brain homogenate from a scrapie-infected Suffolk ewe (derived from USA), whereas a rhesus macaque and a chimpanzee exposed to the same inoculum remained healthy 9 years post-exposure1. This inoculum also induced TSE in squirrel monkeys after 4 passages in mice. Other scrapie transmission attempts in macaque failed but had more shorter periods of observation in comparison to the current study. Further, it is possible that there are differences in the zoonotic potential of different scrapie strains.
The most striking observation in our study is the extended incubation period of scrapie in the macaque model, which has several implications. Firstly, our observations constitute experimental evidence in favor of the zoonotic potential of c-scrapie, at least for this isolate that has been extensively studied32,33,34,35,36. The cross-species zoonotic ability of this isolate should be confirmed by performing duplicate intracerebral exposures and assessing the transmissibility by the oral route (a successful transmission of prion strains through the intracerebral route may not necessarily indicate the potential for oral transmission37). However, such confirmatory experiments may require more than one decade, which is hardly compatible with current general management and support of scientific projects; thus this study should be rather considered as a case report.
Secondly, transmission of c-BSE to primates occurred within 8 years post exposure for the lowest doses able to transmit the disease (the survival period after inoculation is inversely proportional to the initial amount of infectious inoculum). The occurrence of scrapie 10 years after exposure to a high dose (25 mg) of scrapie-infected sheep brain suggests that the macaque has a higher species barrier for sheep c-scrapie than c-BSE, although it is notable that previous studies based on in vitro conversion of PrP suggested that BSE and scrapie prions would have a similar conversion potential for human PrP38.
Thirdly, prion diseases typically have longer incubation periods after oral exposure than after intracerebral inoculations: since humans can develop Kuru 47 years after oral exposure39, an incubation time of several decades after oral exposure to scrapie would therefore be expected, leading the disease to occur in older adults, i.e. the peak age for cases considered to be sporadic disease, and making a distinction between scrapie-associated and truly sporadic disease extremely difficult to appreciate.
Fourthly, epidemiologic evidence is necessary to confirm the zoonotic potential of an animal disease suggested by experimental studies. A relatively short incubation period and a peculiar epidemiological situation (e.g., all the first vCJD cases occurring in the country with the most important ongoing c-BSE epizootic) led to a high degree of suspicion that c-BSE was the cause of vCJD. Sporadic CJD are considered spontaneous diseases with an almost stable and constant worldwide prevalence (0.5–2 cases per million inhabitants per year), and previous epidemiological studies were unable to draw a link between sCJD and classical scrapie6,7,40,41, even though external causes were hypothesized to explain the occurrence of some sCJD clusters42,43,44. However, extended incubation periods exceeding several decades would impair the predictive values of epidemiological surveillance for prion diseases, already weakened by a limited prevalence of prion diseases and the multiplicity of isolates gathered under the phenotypes of “scrapie” and “sporadic CJD”.
Fifthly, considering this 10 year-long incubation period, together with both laboratory and epidemiological evidence of decade or longer intervals between infection and clinical onset of disease, no premature conclusions should be drawn from negative transmission studies in cynomolgus macaques with less than a decade of observation, as in the aforementioned historical transmission studies of scrapie to primates1,8,9. Our observations and those of others45,46 to date are unable to provide definitive evidence regarding the zoonotic potential of CWD, atypical/Nor98 scrapie or H-type BSE. The extended incubation period of the scrapie-affected macaque in the current study also underscores the limitations of rodent models expressing human PrP for assessing the zoonotic potential of some prion diseases since their lifespan remains limited to approximately two years21,47,48. This point is illustrated by the fact that the recently reported transmission of scrapie to humanized mice was not associated with clinical signs for up to 750 days and occurred in an extreme minority of mice with only a marginal increase in attack rate upon second passage13. The low attack rate in these studies is certainly linked to the limited lifespan of mice compared to the very long periods of observation necessary to demonstrate the development of scrapie. Alternatively, one could estimate that a successful second passage is the result of strain adaptation to the species barrier, thus poorly relevant of the real zoonotic potential of the original scrapie isolate of sheep origin49. The development of scrapie in this primate after an incubation period compatible with its lifespan complements the study conducted in transgenic (humanized) mice; taken together these studies suggest that some isolates of sheep scrapie can promote misfolding of the human prion protein and that scrapie can develop within the lifespan of some primate species.
In addition to previous studies on scrapie transmission to primate1,8,9 and the recently published study on transgenic humanized mice13, our results constitute new evidence for recommending that the potential risk of scrapie for human health should not be dismissed. Indeed, human PrP transgenic mice and primates are the most relevant models for investigating the human transmission barrier. To what extent such models are informative for measuring the zoonotic potential of an animal TSE under field exposure conditions is unknown. During the past decades, many protective measures have been successfully implemented to protect cattle from the spread of c-BSE, and some of these measures have been extended to sheep and goats to protect from scrapie according to the principle of precaution. Since cases of c-BSE have greatly reduced in number, those protective measures are currently being challenged and relaxed in the absence of other known zoonotic animal prion disease. We recommend that risk managers should be aware of the long term potential risk to human health of at least certain scrapie isolates, notably for lymphotropic strains like the classical scrapie strain used in the current study. Relatively high amounts of infectivity in peripheral lymphoid organs in animals infected with these strains could lead to contamination of food products produced for human consumption. Efforts should also be maintained to further assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains in long-term studies, notably lymphotropic strains with high prevalence like CWD, which is spreading across North America, and atypical/Nor98 scrapie (Nor98)50 that was first detected in the past two decades and now represents approximately half of all reported cases of prion diseases in small ruminants worldwide, including territories previously considered as scrapie free... Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.
Like lambs to the slaughter
* 31 March 2001 *
Debora MacKenzie *
Magazine issue 2284
Suspect symptoms
What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep infected with scrapie?
Exclusive from New Scientist magazine
Four years ago, Terry Singeltary watched his mother die horribly from a degenerative brain disease. Doctors told him it was Alzheimer's, but Singeltary was suspicious.
The diagnosis didn't fit her violent symptoms, and he demanded an autopsy. It showed she had died of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
Photo: Murdo McLeod
Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein deforming by chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise.
He is one of a number of campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to BSE, is caused by eating meat from infected animals.
Their suspicions have focused on sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in flocks across Europe and North America.
Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight to the campaigners' fears.
To their complete surprise, the researchers found that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.
"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French Atomic Energy Commission's medical research laboratory in Fontenay-aux-Roses, south-west of Paris.
Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he now wants to trawl back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been caused by eating infected mutton or lamb.
Brain damage Scrapie has been around for centuries and until now there has been no evidence that it poses a risk to human health.
But if the French finding means that scrapie can cause sCJD in people, countries around the world may have overlooked a CJD crisis to rival that caused by BSE.
Deslys and colleagues were originally studying vCJD, not sCJD.
They injected the brains of macaque monkeys with brain from BSE cattle, and from French and British vCJD patients. The brain damage and clinical symptoms in the monkeys were the same for all three.
Mice injected with the original sets of brain tissue or with infected monkey brain also developed the same symptoms.
As a control experiment, the team also injected mice with brain tissue from people and animals with other prion diseases: a French case of sCJD; a French patient who caught sCJD from human-derived growth hormone; sheep with a French strain of scrapie; and mice carrying a prion derived from an American scrapie strain.
As expected, they all affected the brain in a different way from BSE and vCJD.
But while the American strain of scrapie caused different damage from sCJD, the French strain produced exactly the same pathology. Multiple strains "The main evidence that scrapie does not affect humans has been epidemiology," says Moira Bruce of the neuropathogenesis unit of the Institute for Animal Health in Edinburgh, who was a member of the same team as Deslys.
"You see about the same incidence of the disease everywhere, whether or not there are many sheep, and in countries such as New Zealand with no scrapie," she says.
In the only previous comparisons of sCJD and scrapie in mice, Bruce found they were dissimilar. But there are more than 20 strains of scrapie, and six of sCJD.
"You would not necessarily see a relationship between the two with epidemiology if only some strains affect only some people," says Deslys.
Bruce is cautious about the mouse results, but agrees they require further investigation.
Other trials of scrapie and sCJD in mice, she says, are in progress.
Deformed proteins People can have three different genetic variations of the human prion protein, and each type of protein can fold up two different ways.
Kretschmar has found that these six combinations correspond to six clinical types of sCJD: each type of normal prion produces a particular pathology when it spontaneously deforms to produce sCJD. But if these proteins deform because of infection with a disease-causing prion, the relationship between pathology and prion type should be different, as it is in vCJD.
"If we look at brain samples from sporadic CJD cases and find some that do not fit the pattern," says Kretschmar, "that could mean they were caused by infection."
There are 250 deaths per year from sCJD in the US, and a similar incidence elsewhere.
Singeltary and other US activists think that some of these people died after eating contaminated meat or "nutritional" pills containing dried animal brain.
Governments will have a hard time facing activists like Singeltary if it turns out that some sCJD isn't as spontaneous as doctors have insisted.
Deslys's work on macaques also provides further proof that the human disease vCJD is caused by BSE.
And the experiments showed that vCJD is much more virulent to primates than BSE, even when injected into the bloodstream rather than the brain. This, says Deslys, means that there is an even bigger risk than we thought that vCJD can be passed from one patient to another through contaminated blood transfusions and surgical instruments.
More at: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (vol 98, p 4142)
Correspondence about this story should be directed to letters@newscientist.com 1900 GMT, 28 March 2001
* New Scientist
http://www.newscientist.com/dailynews/news.jsp?id=ns9999560
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg16922840.300
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg16922840.300
Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion
Cervid to human prion transmission
Kong, Qingzhong Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, United States
We hypothesize that:
(1) The classic CWD prion strain can infect humans at low levels in the brain and peripheral lymphoid tissues;
(2) The cervid-to-human transmission barrier is dependent on the cervid prion strain and influenced by the host (human) prion protein (PrP) primary sequence;
(3) Reliable essays can be established to detect CWD infection in humans; and
(4) CWD transmission to humans has already occurred. We will test these hypotheses in 4 Aims using transgenic (Tg) mouse models and complementary in vitro approaches.
(1) The classic CWD prion strain can infect humans at low levels in the brain and peripheral lymphoid tissues;
(2) The cervid-to-human transmission barrier is dependent on the cervid prion strain and influenced by the host (human) prion protein (PrP) primary sequence;
(3) Reliable essays can be established to detect CWD infection in humans; and
(4) CWD transmission to humans has already occurred. We will test these hypotheses in 4 Aims using transgenic (Tg) mouse models and complementary in vitro approaches.
ZOONOTIC CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION UPDATE
here is the latest;
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE
Oral transmission of CWD into Cynomolgus macaques: signs of atypical disease, prion conversion and infectivity in macaques and bio-assayed transgenic mice
Hermann M. Schatzl, Samia Hannaoui, Yo-Ching Cheng, Sabine Gilch (Calgary Prion Research Unit, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada) Michael Beekes (RKI Berlin), Walter Schulz-Schaeffer (University of Homburg/Saar, Germany), Christiane Stahl-Hennig (German Primate Center) & Stefanie Czub (CFIA Lethbridge).
To date, BSE is the only example of interspecies transmission of an animal prion disease into humans. The potential zoonotic transmission of CWD is an alarming issue and was addressed by many groups using a variety of in vitro and in vivo experimental systems. Evidence from these studies indicated a substantial, if not absolute, species barrier, aligning with the absence of epidemiological evidence suggesting transmission into humans. Studies in non-human primates were not conclusive so far, with oral transmission into new-world monkeys and no transmission into old-world monkeys. Our consortium has challenged 18 Cynomolgus macaques with characterized CWD material, focusing on oral transmission with muscle tissue. Some macaques have orally received a total of 5 kg of muscle material over a period of 2 years.
After 5-7 years of incubation time some animals showed clinical symptoms indicative of prion disease, and prion neuropathology and PrPSc deposition were detected in spinal cord and brain of some euthanized animals. PrPSc in immunoblot was weakly detected in some spinal cord materials and various tissues tested positive in RT-QuIC, including lymph node and spleen homogenates. To prove prion infectivity in the macaque tissues, we have intracerebrally inoculated 2 lines of transgenic mice, expressing either elk or human PrP. At least 3 TgElk mice, receiving tissues from 2 different macaques, showed clinical signs of a progressive prion disease and brains were positive in immunoblot and RT-QuIC. Tissues (brain, spinal cord and spleen) from these and pre-clinical mice are currently tested using various read-outs and by second passage in mice. Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were so far negative for clear clinical prion disease (some mice >300 days p.i.). In parallel, the same macaque materials are inoculated into bank voles.
Taken together, there is strong evidence of transmissibility of CWD orally into macaques and from macaque tissues into transgenic mouse models, although with an incomplete attack rate.
The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology.
Our ongoing studies will show whether the transmission of CWD into macaques and passage in transgenic mice represents a form of non-adaptive prion amplification, and whether macaque-adapted prions have the potential to infect mice expressing human PrP.
The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD..
***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD. <***
https://prion2018.org/
READING OVER THE PRION 2018 ABSTRACT BOOK, LOOKS LIKE THEY FOUND THAT from this study ;
P190 Human prion disease mortality rates by occurrence of chronic wasting disease in freeranging cervids, United States
Abrams JY (1), Maddox RA (1), Schonberger LB (1), Person MK (1), Appleby BS (2), Belay ED (1) (1) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Atlanta, GA, USA (2) Case Western Reserve University, National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center (NPDPSC), Cleveland, OH, USA..
SEEMS THAT THEY FOUND Highly endemic states had a higher rate of prion disease mortality compared to non-CWD
states.
AND ANOTHER STUDY;
P172 Peripheral Neuropathy in Patients with Prion Disease
Wang H(1), Cohen M(1), Appleby BS(1,2) (1) University Hospitals Cleveland Medical Center, Cleveland, Ohio (2) National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center, Cleveland, Ohio..
IN THIS STUDY, THERE WERE autopsy-proven prion cases from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center that were diagnosed between September 2016 to March 2017,
AND
included 104 patients. SEEMS THEY FOUND THAT The most common sCJD subtype was MV1-2 (30%), followed by MM1-2 (20%),
AND
THAT The Majority of cases were male (60%), AND half of them had exposure to wild game.
snip...
see more on Prion 2017 Macaque study from Prion 2017 Conference and other updated science on cwd tse prion zoonosis below...terry
https://prion2018.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/program.pdf
https://prion2018.org/
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 04, 2018
Cervid to human prion transmission 5R01NS088604-04 Update
http://grantome.com/grant/NIH/R01-NS088604-04
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2018/10/cervid-to-human-prion-transmission.html
snip...full text;
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 09, 2019
Experts: Yes, chronic wasting disease in deer is a public health issue — for people
FRIDAY, JULY 26, 2019
Chronic Wasting Disease in Cervids: Implications for Prion Transmission to Humans and Other Animal Species
1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8
Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.
Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.
Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.
snip...
The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
PMID: 6997404
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract
Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"
Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.
snip...
76/10.12/4.6
Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.
Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).
Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.
Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0
Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)
C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK
National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland
SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).
IN CONFIDENCE SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES
IN CONFIDENCE
reference...
RB3.20
TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES
1. Kuru and CJD have been successfully transmitted to chimpanzees but scrapie and TME have not.
2. We cannot say that scrapie will not transmit to chimpanzees. There are several scrapie strains and I am not aware that all have been tried (that would have to be from mouse passaged material). Nor has a wide enough range of field isolates subsequently strain typed in mice been inoculated by the appropriate routes (i/c, ilp and i/v) :
3. I believe the proposed experiment to determine transmissibility, if conducted, would only show the susceptibility or resistance of the chimpanzee to infection/disease by the routes used and the result could not be interpreted for the predictability of the susceptibility for man. Proposals for prolonged oral exposure of chimpanzees to milk from cattle were suggested a long while ago and rejected.
4. In view of Dr Gibbs' probable use of chimpazees Mr Wells' comments (enclosed) are pertinent. I have yet to receive a direct communication from Dr Schellekers but before any collaboration or provision of material we should identify the Gibbs' proposals and objectives.
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severely would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.
6. A negative result would take a lifetime to determine but that would be a shorter period than might be available for human exposure and it would still not answer the question regarding mans' susceptibility. In the meantime no doubt the negativity would be used defensively. It would however be counterproductive if the experiment finally became positive. We may learn more about public reactions following next Monday' s meeting.
R. Bradley
23 September 1990
CVO (+Mr Wells' comments)
Dr T W A Little
Dr B J Shreeve
90/9.23/1.1.
IN CONFIDENCE CHIMPANZEES
CODE 18-77 Reference RB3.46
Some further information that may assist in decision making has been gained by discussion with Dr Rosalind Ridley.
She says that careful study of Gajdusek's work shows no increased susceptibility of chimpanzees over New World Monkeys such as Squirrel Monkeys. She does not think it would tell you anything about the susceptibility to man. Also Gajdusek did not, she believes, challenge chimpanzees with scrapie as severely as we did pigs and we know little of that source of scrapie. Comparisons would be difficult. She also would not expect the Home Office to sanction such experiments here unless there was a very clear and important objective that would be important for human health protection. She doubted such a case could be made. If this is the case she thought it would be unethical to do an experiment abroad because we could not do it in our own country.
Retrospectively she feels they should have put up more marmosets than they did. They all remain healthy. They would normally regard the transmission as negative if no disease resulted in five years.
We are not being asked for a decision but I think that before we made one we should gain as much knowledge as we can. If we decided to proceed we would have to bear any criticisms for many years if there was an adverse view by scientists ormedia. This should not be undertaken lightly. There is already some adverse comment here, I gather, on the pig experiment though that will subside.
The Gibbs' (as' distinct from Schellekers') study is somewhat different. We are merely supplying material for comparative studies in a laboratory with the greatest experience of human SEs in the world and it has been sanctioned by USDA (though we do not know for certain yet if chimpanzees specifically will be used). This would keep it at a lower profile than if we conducted such an experiment in the UK or Europe.
I consider we must have very powerful and defendable objectives to go beyond Gibbs' proposed experiments and should not initiate others just because an offer has been made.
Scientists have a responsibility to seek other methods of investigative research other than animal experimentation. At present no objective has convinced me we need to do research using Chimpanzees - a species in need of protection. Resisting such proposals would enable us to communicate that information to the scientist and the public should the need arise. A line would have been drawn.
CVO cc Dr T Dr B W A Little Dr B J Shreeve
R Bradley
26 September 1990
90/9.26/3.2
Possible Changes in the Scrapie Agent
I AM NOT AN ADVOCATE FOR EXPERIMENTAL USE OF CHIMPANZEES AS TEST VICTIMS. However, I would be an advocate for (and i have said this before over the years), of death row inmates being used. Their families could be compensated with a monetary award, and the death row inmates could do one final thing for the good of humanity. There going to die anyway. just my opinion. ...TSS-2011
POLICY - RESTRICTED
CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE: 3RD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UK SURVEILLANCE UNIT
1. This submission, which has been agreed with colleagues in HEF(M). alerts PS(L) to the contents of the forthcoming annual report of the CJD Surveillance Unit and presents options for publication. It also highlights concern over the presentation of results which could be misrepresented by the media and others as evidence of a lilnk between CJD and the consumption of veal. ...
RECOMMENDATION
2. PS(L) is invited to agree the recommendation at para 13.
PROBLEM
7. The main findings in the case-control study were STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN CONSUMPTION OF VEAL OR VENISON AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CJD (INCREASED RISKS OF 2-13x). There was also evidence of a dose-response relationship between dietary exposure and development of the disease. (Last year's findings showed an apparent association between eating black pudding and risk of CJD which was neither statistically significant nor biologically plausible - interestingly, this has not been (replicated was marked out with something i cannot read), and then this complete sentence was marked through to be replaced ;
THIS YEAR'S FINDINGS SHOW A NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS BUT THE STRONGEST IS FOR VEAL.
IP PS(L) wishes to probe this further we think it best to explain the matter VERBALLY. The problem is how to present the findings in this year's annual report in a way which avoids unnecessary public alarm and limits the scope for media scare stores. (or the facts...TSS)
This is of considerable concern given recent development. In particular Ministers will be particularly concerned about the European dimension given the recent troubles with the Germans.
9. DH doctors advise - and we understand Dr Wills agrees - that the association the study found between the developments of CJD and veal consumption cannot be regarded as demonstrating a causal relationship or give any reason to change the advice that eating beef and veal is safe. IF PS(L) wishes to probe this further we think it best to explain the matter verbally. The problem is how to present the findings in this year's annual report in a way which avoids unnecessary public alarm and limits the scope for media scare stories.
Next steps ...
snip... full text ;
PROBLEM
7. The main findings in the case-control study were STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN CONSUMPTION OF VEAL OR VENISON AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CJD (INCREASED RISKS OF 2-13x). There was also evidence of a dose-response relationship between dietary exposure and development of the disease. (Last year's findings showed an apparent association between eating black pudding and risk of CJD which was neither statistically significant nor biologically plausible - interestingly, this has not been (replicated was marked out with something i cannot read), and then this complete sentence was marked through to be replaced ;
see watered down report here ;
Lessons from BSE
4. In retrospect, a problem of scrapie transmission in feedstuffs was perhaps predictable.
Poultry feeding and Fish farming may be particular areas worth studying...
IN CONFIDENCE
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 25, AUGUST 1995
snip...
To minimise the risk of farmers' claims for compensation from feed compounders.
To minimise the potential damage to compound feed markets through adverse publicity.
To maximise freedom of action for feed compounders, notably by maintaining the availability of meat and bone meal as a raw material in animal feeds, and ensuring time is available to make any changes which may be required.
snip...
THE FUTURE
4..........
MAFF remains under pressure in Brussels and is not skilled at handling potentially explosive issues.
5. Tests _may_ show that ruminant feeds have been sold which contain illegal traces of ruminant protein. More likely, a few positive test results will turn up but proof that a particular feed mill knowingly supplied it to a particular farm will be difficult if not impossible.
6. The threat remains real and it will be some years before feed compounders are free of it. The longer we can avoid any direct linkage between feed milling _practices_ and actual BSE cases, the more likely it is that serious damage can be avoided. ...
Differentiation of ruminant transmissible spongiform encephalopathy isolate types, including bovine spongiform encephalopathy and CH1641 scrapie
J. G. Jacobs1, M. Sauer2, L. J. M. van Keulen1, Y. Tang2, A. Bossers1 and J. P. M. Langeveld1
1 Department of Infection Biology, Central Veterinary Institute of Wageningen UR, PO Box 65, 8200 AB Lelystad, The Netherlands 2 Department of Molecular Pathogenesis and Genetics, Veterinary Laboratories Agency-Weybridge, Woodham Lane, New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK
Correspondence J. P. M. Langeveld jan.langeveld@wur.nl
With increased awareness of the diversity of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) strains in the ruminant population, comes an appreciation of the need for improved methods of differential diagnosis. Exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has been associated with the human TSE, variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease, emphasizing the necessity in distinguishing low-risk TSE types from BSE. TSE type discrimination in ruminants such as cattle, sheep, goats and deer, requires the application of several prion protein (PrP)-specific antibodies in parallel immunochemical tests on brain homogenates or tissue sections from infected animals. This study uses in a single incubation step, three PrP-specific antibodies and fluorescent Alexa dye-labelled anti-mouse Fabs on a Western blot. The usual amount of brain tissue needed is 0.5 mg. This multiplex application of antibodies directed towards three different PrP epitopes enabled differential diagnosis of all established main features of classical scrapie, BSE and Nor98-like scrapie in sheep and goats, as well as the currently known BSE types C, H and L in cattle. Moreover, due to an antibody-dependent dual PrP-banding pattern, for the first time CH1641 scrapie of sheep can be reliably discriminated from the other TSE isolate types in sheep.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
IN CONFIDENCE
SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES
IN CONFIDENCE
Seriously’ (YB88/6.8/4.1)
HB Parry Seriously’ (YB88/6.8/4.1)
IF the scrapie agent is generated from ovine DNA and thence causes disease in other species, then perhaps, bearing in mind the possible role of scrapie in CJD of humans (Davinpour et al, 1985), scrapie and not BSE should be the notifiable disease.
1: Neuroepidemiology. 1985;4(4):240-9.
Sheep consumption: a possible source of spongiform encephalopathy in humans.
Davanipour Z, Alter M, Sobel E, Callahan M.
A fatal spongiform encephalopathy of sheep and goats (scrapie) shares many characteristics with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), a similar dementing illness of humans. To investigate the possibility that CJD is acquired by ingestion of contaminated sheep products, we collected information on production, slaughtering practices, and marketing of sheep in Pennsylvania. The study revealed that sheep were usually marketed before central nervous system signs of scrapie are expected to appear; breeds known to be susceptible to the disease were the most common breeds raised in the area; sheep were imported from other states including those with a high frequency of scrapie; use of veterinary services on the sheep farms investigated and, hence, opportunities to detect the disease were limited; sheep producers in the area knew little about scrapie despite the fact that the disease has been reported in the area, and animal organs including sheep organs were sometimes included in processed food. Therefore, it was concluded that in Pennsylvania there are some 'weak links' through which scrapie-infected animals could contaminate human food, and that consumption of these foods could perhaps account for spongiform encephalopathy in humans. The weak links observed are probably not unique to Pennsylvania.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=3915057&dopt=Abstract
Thursday, August 20, 2015 Doctor William J. Hadlow
William J. Hadlow Dr. Hadlow (Ohio State ’48), 94, Hamilton, Montana, died June 20, 2015.
Spongiform Encephalopathy in Captive Wild ZOO BSE INQUIRY
Among ovine TSEs, classical scrapie and Nor98 were discriminated from both Norwegian moose isolates, while CH1641 samples had molecular features partially overlapping with the moose, i.e. a low MW PrPres and the presence of CTF13. In contrast, moose PrPSc did not overlap with any bovine PrPSc. Indeed, the MW of moose PrPres was lower than H-BSE and similar to C-BSE and L-BSE PrPres, but the two bovine prions lacked additional PrPres fragments.
Conclusions: Unexpectedly, PrPSc from Norwegian moose revealed features substantially different from all other CWD isolates. The PrPSc pattern of Norwegian moose was also different from Canadian moose, suggesting that the variant PrPSc type observed does not simply reflect a host factor and could represent a new CWD strain. Furthermore, PrPSc of Norwegian moose can be easily discriminated from all BSE types, classical scrapie and Nor98, while showing significant overlapping only with CH1641. Bioassay in voles will help to clarify whether the different PrPSc types observed reflect the presence of a new CWD strain in Norwegian moose, and its relationships with known animal TSEs.
References: 1Benestad et al, Vet Res (2016}47:88
PRION 2017 DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS
please see;
***Our transmission study demonstrates that CH 1641-like scrapie is likely to be more virulent than classical scrapie in cattle.
In the US, scrapie is reported primarily in sheep homozygous for 136A/171Q (AAQQ) and the disease phenotype is similar to that seen with experimental strain CH1641.
***Our transmission study demonstrates that CH 1641-like scrapie is likely to be more virulent than classical scrapie in cattle.
P-088 Transmission of experimental CH1641-like scrapie to bovine PrP overexpression mice
Kohtaro Miyazawa1, Kentaro Masujin1, Hiroyuki Okada1, Yuichi Matsuura1, Takashi Yokoyama2
1Influenza and Prion Disease Research Center, National Institute of Animal Health, NARO, Japan; 2Department of Planning and General Administration, National Institute of Animal Health, NARO
Introduction: Scrapie is a prion disease in sheep and goats. CH1641-lke scrapie is characterized by a lower molecular mass of the unglycosylated form of abnormal prion protein (PrpSc) compared to that of classical scrapie. It is worthy of attention because of the biochemical similarities of the Prpsc from CH1641-like and BSE affected sheep. We have reported that experimental CH1641-like scrapie is transmissible to bovine PrP overexpression (TgBoPrP) mice (Yokoyama et al. 2010). We report here the further details of this transmission study and compare the biological and biochemical properties to those of classical scrapie affected TgBoPrP mice.
Methods: The details of sheep brain homogenates used in this study are described in our previous report (Yokoyama et al. 2010). TgBoPrP mice were intracerebrally inoculated with a 10% brain homogenate of each scrapie strain. The brains of mice were subjected to histopathological and biochemical analyses.
Results: Prpsc banding pattern of CH1641-like scrapie affected TgBoPrP mice was similar to that of classical scrapie affected mice. Mean survival period of CH1641-like scrapie affected TgBoPrP mice was 170 days at the 3rd passage and it was significantly shorter than that of classical scrapie affected mice (439 days). Lesion profiles and Prpsc distributions in the brains also differed between CH1641-like and classical scrapie affected mice.
Conclusion: We succeeded in stable transmission of CH1641-like scrapie to TgBoPrP mice. Our transmission study demonstrates that CH 1641-like scrapie is likely to be more virulent than classical scrapie in cattle.
snip...
In the US, scrapie is reported primarily in sheep homozygous for 136A/171Q (AAQQ) and the disease phenotype is similar to that seen with experimental strain CH1641.
snip...see ;
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 08, 2019
EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) Update on chronic wasting disease (CWD) III
***> cattle, pigs, sheep, cwd, tse, prion, oh my!
***> In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006).
Sheep and cattle may be exposed to CWD via common grazing areas with affected deer but so far, appear to be poorly susceptible to mule deer CWD (Sigurdson, 2008). In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). It is not known how susceptible humans are to CWD but given that the prion can be present in muscle, it is likely that humans have been exposed to the agent via consumption of venison (Sigurdson, 2008). Initial experimental research suggests that human susceptibility to CWD is low and there may be a robust species barrier for CWD transmission to humans (Sigurdson, 2008), however the risk appetite for a public health threat may still find this level unacceptable.
cwd scrapie pigs oral routes
***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <***
>*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <***
***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 5="" 6="" at="" by="" detected="" eia.="" examined="" group="" in="" intracranial="" least="" lymphoid="" month="" months="" of="" one="" pigs="" positive="" prpsc="" quic="" the="" tissues="" was="">6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 4="" and="" group="" months="" oral="">6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%).
***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period.
This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease.
Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.
Friday, December 14, 2012
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
snip.....
In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.
Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:
1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and
2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.
Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.
The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.
Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.
There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.
snip.....
36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).
The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).
Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.
snip.....
The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).
snip.....
In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.
snip.....
In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible... For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.
snip.....
Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.
snip.....
PLOS ONE Journal
IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT
***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.
***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.
*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***
http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?root=86610
***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.
*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***
http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?root=86610
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply
***> READ THIS VERY, VERY, CAREFULLY, AUGUST 1997 MAD COW FEED BAN WAS A SHAM, AS I HAVE STATED SINCE 1997! 3 FAILSAFES THE FDA ET AL PREACHED AS IF IT WERE THE GOSPEL, IN TERMS OF MAD COW BSE DISEASE IN USA, AND WHY IT IS/WAS/NOT A PROBLEM FOR THE USA, and those are;
BSE TESTING (failed terribly and proven to be a sham)
BSE SURVEILLANCE (failed terribly and proven to be a sham)
BSE 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS (another colossal failure, and proven to be a sham)
these are facts folks. trump et al just admitted it with the feed ban.
see;
FDA Reports on VFD Compliance
John Maday
August 30, 2019 09:46 AM VFD-Form 007 (640x427)
Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach. ( John Maday ) Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach to help feed mills, veterinarians and producers understand and comply with the requirements. Since then, FDA has gradually increased the number of VFD inspections and initiated enforcement actions when necessary. On August 29, FDA released its first report on inspection and compliance activities. The report, titled “Summary Assessment of Veterinary Feed Directive Compliance Activities Conducted in Fiscal Years 2016 – 2018,” is available online.
10 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007 CODE Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA,
Recall # V-025-2007
CODE The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm
PRODUCT O-NO-MORE (Formerly ORPHAN-NO-MORE) Calf Claimer Powder, packaged in 11-oz. bottles, For Animal Use Only.
Recall # V-043-2007 CODE A06 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Springer Magrath Co., Mc Cook, NE, by telephone on January 2, 2007, fax dated January 9, 2007, by letters on February 22, 2007, March 12, March 14 and March 21, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON The finished product was manufactured with prohibited bovine blood meal and did not bear the cautionary BSE statement that the product should not be fed to ruminants.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
Approximately 13,255 bottles DISTRIBUTION
Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR JUNE 13, 2007 ###
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120458.htm
PRODUCT
Dairy cattle feed blends containing ProLak and/or ProAmino II protein concentrate, Recall # V-020-2007
CODE
All finished product manufactured from April, 3, 2006 to April 30, 2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Eatonton Co-Op Feed Company, Eatonton, GA, by letter on/about December 12, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Finished feed product was manufactured from raw feed material that may have been contaminated with ruminant derived protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
25 tons
DISTRIBUTION
GA ___________________________________
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 28, 2007
###
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120443.htm
PRODUCT
O-NO-MORE (Formerly ORPHAN-NO-MORE) Calf Claimer Powder, packaged in 9-oz. bottles, For Animal Use Only, Recall # V-011-2007
CODE
A07
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Springer Magrath Co., McCook, NE, by telephone on January 11, 2007 and fax on January 12, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
The bovine blood meal which was used to manufacture the finished product was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal, and the finished product is not labeled with the cautionary statement that it should not be fed to ruminants.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
300/9-oz. bottles
DISTRIBUTION
NE
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR JANUARY 31, 2007
###
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120439.htm
BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;
b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;
c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;
d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
477.72 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6;
b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6.
CODE
None. Bulk product
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June 28, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1,484 tons
DISTRIBUTION
TN and WV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 6, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2006/ucm120418.htm
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
Approximately 2,223 tons
DISTRIBUTION
KY
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1,220 tons
DISTRIBUTION
KY
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated recall is completed.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
40 tons
DISTRIBUTION
LA and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
7,150 tons
DISTRIBUTION
MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
87 tons
DISTRIBUTION
MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
350 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6
CODE
All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION
AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2006/ucm120414.htm
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE
a) Bulk
b) None
c) Bulk
d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html
what about that ALABAMA MAD COW, AND MAD COW FEED THERE FROM IN THAT STATE ???
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY
*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;
b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;
c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;
d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL
______________________________
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html
BIO-RAD BSE TEST POLITICAL REPLY TO TSS
Subject: Re: USDA/APHIS JUNE 2004 'ENHANCED' BSE/TSE COVER UP UPDATE DECEMBER 19, 2004 USA
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 12:27:06 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
BSE-L
snip...
OH, i did ask Bio-Rad about this with NO reply to date;
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: USA BIO-RADs INCONCLUSIVEs
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 15:37:28 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: susan_berg@bio-rad.com
Hello Susan and Bio-Rad,
Happy Holidays!
I wish to ask a question about Bio-Rad and USDA BSE/TSE testing and there inconclusive. IS the Bio-Rad test for BSE/TSE that complicated, or is there most likely some human error we are seeing here?
HOW can Japan have 2 positive cows with No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP- , BUT in the USA, these cows are considered 'negative'?
IS there more politics working here than science in the USA?
What am I missing?
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: USDA: More mad cow testing will demonstrate beef's safety
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 09:26:19 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
snip...end
Experts doubt USDA's mad cow results
snip...END
WELL, someone did call me from Bio-Rad about this, however it was not Susan Berg. but i had to just about take a blood oath not to reveal there name. IN fact they did not want me to even mention this, but i feel it is much much to important. I have omitted any I.D. of this person, but thought I must document this ;
Bio-Rad, TSS phone conversation 12/28/04
Finally spoke with ;
Bio-Rad Laboratories 2000 Alfred Nobel Drive Hercules, CA 94547 Ph: 510-741-6720 Fax: 510-741-5630 Email: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
at approx. 14:00 hours 12/28/04, I had a very pleasant phone conversation with XXXX XXXXX about the USDA and the inconclusive BSE testing problems they seem to keep having. X was very very cautious as to speak directly about USDA and it's policy of not using WB. X was very concerned as a Bio-Rad official of retaliation of some sort. X would only speak of what other countries do, and that i should take that as an answer. I told X I understood that it was a very loaded question and X agreed several times over and even said a political one.
my question;
Does Bio-Rad believe USDA's final determination of False positive, without WB, and considering the new atypical TSEs not showing positive with -IHC and -HP ???
ask if i was a reporter. i said no, i was with CJD Watch and that i had lost my mother to hvCJD. X did not want any of this recorded or repeated.
again, very nervous, will not answer directly about USDA for fear of retaliation, but again said X tell me what other countries are doing and finding, and that i should take it from there.
"very difficult to answer"
"very political"
"very loaded question"
outside USA and Canada, they use many different confirmatory tech. in house WB, SAF, along with IHC, HP, several times etc. you should see at several talks meetings (TSE) of late Paris Dec 2, that IHC- DOES NOT MEAN IT IS NEGATIVE. again, look what the rest of the world is doing.
said something about Dr. Houston stating;
any screening assay, always a chance for human error. but with so many errors (i am assuming X meant inconclusive), why are there no investigations, just false positives?
said something about ''just look at the sheep that tested IHC- but were positive''. ...
TSS
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Your questions
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 15:58:11 -0800
From: To: flounder@wt.net
Hi Terry:
............................................snip
Let me know your phone number so I can talk to you about the Bio-Rad BSE test.
Thank you
Regards
Bio-Rad Laboratories 2000 Alfred Nobel Drive Hercules, CA 94547 Ph: 510-741-6720 Fax: 510-741-5630 Email:
=================================
snip...end...TSS
TSS REPORT ON 2ND TEJAS MAD COW Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600 (the one that did NOT get away, thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong)
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett
References: <[log in to unmask]>
<[log in to unmask] us>
Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething, but they forgot a url for update?
I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you confirm???
terry
============================== ==============================
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600
From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
References: <[log in to unmask]>
The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no information about the animal being in Texas.
Carla At 09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:
>Greetings Carla,
>>i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from
>TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?
>>thank you,
>Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
>>
=================== ===================
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600
From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
References: <[log in to unmask]>
<[log in to unmask] us>
<[log in to unmask]>
<[log in to unmask] us>
<[log in to unmask]>
our computer department was working on a place holder we could post USDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonight by NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcement when we hear something.
At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004, you wrote: >why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?
>>Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:
>November 22: Press Release title here
>>star image More BSE information
>>>>terry
>>Carla Everett wrote:
>>>no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test...
>>no confirmation on location of animal.
>>>>>>
========================== ==========================
THEN, 7+ MONTHS OF COVER-UP BY JOHANN ET AL! no doubt about it now $$$
NO, it's not pretty, be nice, im not pretty, but these are the facts, take em or leave em, however, you cannot change them.
with kindest regards,
I am still sincerely disgusted and tired in sunny Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
FULL 130 LASHINGS TO USDA BY OIG again
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Statement
May 4, 2004
Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.
####
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: Congressman Henry Waxmans's Letter to the Honorable Ann Veneman on failure by USDA/APHIS TO TEST TEXAS MAD COW
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 2004 16:48:31 –0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de References: 40A8CD52.1070308@wt.net
######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########
USA BSE RED BOOK
October 1998
BSE Red Book 2.1-36
7.2.1.7 Laboratory Coordination--The Laboratory Coordination Officer will advise the READE(3 Director concerning laboratory capabilities and appropriate laboratory examinations to be conducted to provide needed results as rapidly as possible. This individual will assist with interpretation of results.
seems that if the 'enhanced BSE/TSE testing program' is to test some 400,000+ animals in 1 1/2 years, they better hurry up, times a wasting.
BSE Red Book 2.1-39
7.6 Depopulation Procedures
Under no circumstances may BSE suspects be sent fo slaughhter or rendering.
snip...
BSE Red Book 2.1-40
7.7 Disposal Under no circumstances may BSE suspects be sent to slaughter or rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing. Field personel should arrange for the carcass to be transported to and examined by a qualified veterinary pathologist or field veterinary medical officer. After the pathologic examination has been completed and the necessary diagnostic specimens have been obtained, field personnel should arrange for disposal of the carcass. Before a method of disposal is selected, there are many factors that must be considered, and often other State and Federal agencies must be consulted. The environmental and legal impacts of the operation must be considered. Upon recommendation of the State or Federal agencies, VS may consider other disposal methods.
snip...
7.7.3 Rendering Because BSE is spread by rendered animal protein, BSE-suspect and confirmed carcasses must not be rendered, unless the rendered material is incinerated. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that dead BSE animals or carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing.
snip...
7.10.11 Prevention--Suspects and animals confirmed to have BSE must not be rendered. Producers, feed mills, and rendering establishments should adhere to U.S. State and local rendering policies and FDA regulations concerning the feeding of rendered animal protein to ruminants.
TSS
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. wrote:
######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM 2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143
> www.house.gov/reform
> > May 13, 2004
> > The Honorable Ann M. Veneman Secretary of Agriculture Department of Agriculture 1400 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20250
Dear Madam Secretary:
I am writing to express concern that the recent failure of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to test a Texas cow with neurological symptoms for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) may reflect wider problems in the surveillance program. USDA apparently does not keep track of how many cows condemned for central nervous system symptoms are tested for BSE nor does it require that suspect carcasses be held pending testing. Effective surveillance and control of BSE in the United States require a reliable system for ensuring that potentially infected cows are tested and that no infected materials enter the animal or human food supply.
Under USDA regulations, any cow that exhibits signs of central nervous system (CNS) problems must be condemned by Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) personnel at the plant.1
According to a 1997 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Memorandum, brain samples all of such animals should be sent for BSE testing.2
The memorandum notes that "[i]t is essential that brain specimens be collected from adult cattle condemned for CNS signs as part of our national surveillance of BSE."3
The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4
Despite a request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant to send the carcass for rendering.5
1 9 CFR 309.4.
2 USDA APHIS, Veterinary Services Memorandum No. 580.16. Procedures/or Investigation of Adult Cattle With Clinical Signs of Central Nervous System (CNS) Disease and Procedures for Surveillance of Downer Cows for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) (June 11,1997).
3 Id.
4 U.S. Confirms a Failure to Use Mad Cow Test, Wall Street Journal (May 4, 2004).
The Honorable Ann M. Veneman May 13, 2004 Page 2
This sequence of events is troubling, and it raises the question of whether this is an isolated incident. In 1997, USDA noted a major gap between the number of cattle condemned for CNS symptoms and the number of these cows actually tested for mad cow disease. The Department found:
Based on information provided by the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), the number of adult cattle (2 years of age or greater) condemned at slaughter due to CNS signs is much greater than the number whose brains have been collected for testing.6
Despite recognizing the problem more than six years ago, however, USDA apparently did not adopt procedures to ensure that these samples would be collected. In March 2004, the Government Reform Committee asked USDA to provide, for each of the last five years, the number of BSE tests performed on cattle condemned by FSIS inspectors on the basis of CNS symptoms.7
In response, USDA provided information on the numbers of cattle condemned for CNS symptoms by FSIS, but replied that "[i]t is not possible to determine, from the data we currently collect, how many of these cattle were tested by APHIS for BSE."8
It thus appears that not only does USDA not routinely track the gap between the number of condemned and tested cattle, but that USDA could not even calculate this gap when requested to do so by Congress.
There also appears to be a lack of clarity regarding the disposition of cattle with CNS symptoms while BSE tests are pending. In the past, companies could send cattle awaiting BSE testing results for rendering, which would allow their remains to be used in feed for animals other than ruminants, such as pigs and chickens. After this incident, both FDA and USDA policy appear to have changed — in different ways.
USDA policy has apparently shifted to requesting that companies not send cattle to rendering while awaiting test results. A May 5, 2004 memo from APHIS states, "it is requested — though not required — that [the cattle] not go to inedible rendering until the sample comes
USDA's San Angelo Vets and Techs Ordered Not to Test Suspect Cow, Meating Place (May 5, 2004).
6 USDA APHIS, supra note 2.
7 Letter from Rep. Tom Davis and Rep. Henry A- Waxman to Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman (Mar. 8, 2004).
8 Letter from Ronald F. Hicks, Assistant Administrator, Office of Program Evaluation, Enforcement, and Review- FSIS. to Reo. Henrv A. Waxman- Attachment 1 (Mar. 22- 2004).
The Honorable Ann M. Veneman May 13,2004 Page 3
back negative."9
There is no explanation of why this course of action is requested, but not required.
FDA policy also appears to have shifted towards prohibiting the use of carcasses of cattle with CNS symptoms and indeterminate BSE status in certain types of animal feed. On April 30, FDA requested that the rendering company holding the remains of the Texas cow either destroy them or use them exclusively in swine feed. m the case that the remains are included in swine feed, FDA "will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs."10
Any confusion over what to do with cattle condemned for CNS symptoms awaiting testing for BSE seems unnecessary. The obvious approach is to require companies either to destroy the carcasses or hold them until test results become available. Such a policy would avoid any need for complicated traceback procedures after the discovery of a positive result. According to the information provided to the Committee by USDA, the FSIS has condemned only 200 to 250 cows per year because of signs of central nervous system damage." Mandating the destruction or holding of their carcasses would have minimal economic impact.
The experience with the BSE-infected cow in Washington State illustrates the prudence of waiting for the results of BSE tests. Prior to December 2003, USDA permitted cattle that were sampled as part of the BSE surveillance program to enter commerce even while BSE tests were pending. As a result, when the BSE-infected cow was discovered, it had already entered the food supply. This led to a complicated and partially successful traceback procedure in which hundreds of thousands of pounds of beef had to be destroyed. Because of this debacle, USDA quickly developed a new policy to require holding all carcasses from the human food chain during BSE testing.
I appreciate that you have taken steps to enhance the safety of the U.S. food supply since the discovery of BSE in the United States. I urge you to consider the lessons of this latest incident. USDA should develop a process that ensures the tracking of cattle condemned for CNS signs and should institute a policy requiring all carcasses with pending BSE tests to be destroyed or held. If there are any statutory barriers to these steps, please do not hesitate to let me know.
9 Memo from John R. Clifford, Acting Deputy Administrator, Veterinary Services, and William Smith, Assistant Administrator, Office of Field Operations, Food Safety and Inspection Service, to VSMT, Regional Directors, Area Veterinarians in Charge, and Veterinary Services, Subject: Policy Statement Regarding BSE Sampling of Condemned Cattle at Slaughter Plants - for Immediate Implementation (May 5, 2004) (online at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/BSE_APHIS-FSIS.pdf).
10 FDA, Statement on Cow -with Central Nervous System Symptoms (Apr. 20, 2004) (online at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html).
11 The yearly totals of FSIS antemortem CNS condemnation for all adult cattle were 233 (1999), 220 (2000), 201 (2001), 249 (2002), and 247 (2003). The database for 2003 had not yet closed.
The Honorable Ann M. Veneman May 13, 2004 Page 4
Sincerely,
XXXXX X. XXXXXX
Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Minority Member
Congressman Henry Waxmans's Letter to the Honorable Ann Veneman
http://www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs_108_2/pdfs_inves/pdf_food_usda_mad_cow_may_13_let.pdf
TSS
######### http://mailhost-alt.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########
H. Rept. 108-815 - ACTIVITIES of the HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS 2003-2004 (Pursuant to House Rule XI, 1(d)(4)) 108th Congress (2003-2004)
snip...
After the December 23, 2003, USDA announcement of the discovery of the first U.S. case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [BSE], commonly known as ``mad cow disease,'' the committee initiated a 7-month investigation into concerns about the process for identification of BSE-infected cows and USDA's actions upon discovery of the cow. Committee investigators traveled to Washington State to interview the owner of the slaughterhouse where the BSE-infected cow was identified; requested documents from USDA; and held several meetings with USDA representatives and representatives of the cattle industry.
As a result of the committee's investigation, USDA established written protocols to be followed in case of discovery of another BSE-infected cow. USDA also implemented an expanded BSE surveillance plan to better determine whether BSE is actually present in the U.S. cattle population, and if so, at what level. The committee held a joint hearing with the Committee on Agriculture to examine USDA's expanded surveillance plan, including concerns regarding the written protocols and management of the plan. The committee will continue to conduct oversight over USDA's surveillance plan during the 109th Congress.
THE USDA JUNE 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WAS TERRIBLY FLAWED ;
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency." ........TSS
THURSDAY, JANUARY 23, 2020
USDA Consolidates Regulations for NAHLN Laboratory Testing USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service sent this bulletin at 01/23/2020 02:15 PM EST
March 2019
Pennsylvania Scrapie Infected Sheep Goat Flock
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2019
Sheep Are Susceptible to the Bovine Adapted Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy agent by Intracranial Inoculation and Have Evidence of Infectivity in Lymphoid Tissues
***> ''indicating that sheep inoculated with the bovine TME agent harbor infectivity in their lymph nodes despite a lack of detection with conventional immunoassays.''
TUESDAY, APRIL 24, 2018
ARS Research atypical Nor98 and Michigan Scrapie, CWD, CJD and mad cow feed
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2019
MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMEN BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, TSE PRION A REVIEW 2019
MONDAY, JULY 27, 2020
BSE Inquiry DFA's a review
TUESDAY, JUNE 30, 2020
National Scrapie Eradication Program May 2020 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2020 U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Veterinary Services Strategy and Policy, Ruminant Health Center Small Ruminant Health June 15, 2020
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
